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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO
09/838,142	04/20/2001	Raymond E. Suorsa	033048-059	9523
21839	7590 12/21/2005		EXAMINER	
	N INGERSOLL PC		THOMPSON	, MARC D
(INCLUDING BURNS, DOANE, SWECKER & MATHIS) POST OFFICE BOX 1404			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22313-1404			2144	

DATE MAILED: 12/21/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)		
09/838,142	SUORSA ET AL.		
Examiner	Art Unit		
Marc D. Thompson	2144	-	

	Marc D. Thompson	2144	-
The MAILING DATE of this communication appear	ars on the cover sheet with the d	orrespondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED 17 November 2005 FAILS TO PLACE THIS	APPLICATION IN CONDITION FO	OR ALLOWANCE.	
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on this application, applicant must timely file one of the follow places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a Not a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance time periods:	the same day as filing a Notice of ving replies: (1) an amendment, aff tice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in o	Appeal. To avoid aba idavit, or other evider compliance with 37 Cl	ce, which FR 41.31; or (3)
a) The period for reply expires <u>3</u> months from the mailing date	of the final rejection.		
b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this A no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire la	iter than SIX MONTHS from the mailing	g date of the final rejection	on.
Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (in TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 70		E FIRST REPLY WAS F	ILED WITHIN
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date thave been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extraction and the period of extraction and the period of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.1 ension and the corresponding amount hortened statutory period for reply origithan three months after the mailing da	of the fee. The appropri inally set in the final Offi	ate extension fee be action; or (2) as
2. ☐ The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in comp	liance with 37 CFR 41 37 must be	filed within two month	s of the date of
filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of th	e appeal. Since
AMENDMENTS	out prior to the data of filing a brief	will not be entered by	
 The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, t (a) They raise new issues that would require further cor (b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below 	nsideration and/or search (see NO		ecause
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in bett appeal; and/or		ducing or simplifying	the issues for
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a convergence NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).	corresponding number of finally rej	ected claims.	
,	21 See attached Notice of Non Co	mpliant Amondment	DTOL 324)
 The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12 Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): 		impliant Amendment	P10L-324).
 Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s). 		timely filed amendme	nt canceling the
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) [how the new or amended claims would be rejected is prov The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: <u>None</u> .		ll be entered and an e	xplanation of
Claim(s) objected to: <i>None</i> . Claim(s) rejected: <u>22-31</u> .			•
Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: <u>None</u> .			
 AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 			
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appea	al and/or appellant fai	ls to provide a
10. ☐ The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	-		
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered but See Continuation Sheet.	t does NOT place the application in	n condition for allowar	nce because:
12. Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08 or PTO-1449) Paper N	lo(s)	
13.		DO D. THOMB	001
		RC D. THOMP	•
	Mai	RC THOMPS	SON
		MARY EXAMI	• •

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

Applicant asserts definitions provided for the terms "queue" and "script" as known in the art is sufficient to distinguish the claimed invention from the applied teachings of Suzuki. It is submitted that the breadth of the currently presented claims, interpretation of a "queue" as known and defined in the art as a "data structure" as submitted by Applicant is insufficient to distinguish the disclosed Suzuki "script(s)". Given that one provided definition for claim interpretation of a script was known in the art at the time of filing as "a file of commands to be executed", it is required to properly construct the use of such a term to potentially include inherent characteristics of an associate data structure. That is to say, a "file", per se, inherently comprises a structure of data; there is no reasonable way to separate files from data sets having structure (data structure). The current breadth of the claim(s) provides interpretations which are inconsistent with the commensurate scope of the specification, even when remaining strictly in accordance with the definitions of the terms provided therein. The Suzuki reference is close enough to the purported functionality of the claimed invention to warrant sustaining of the currently set forth position. Creation and server side storage of a list of commands for (a) remote device execution, sequential transfer of the commands to the remote device(s), rebooting of the remote device(s), and resumption of the uncompleted commands as provided in the claims is simply taught by Suzuki.

In addition to the provision for the use of generalized and broadly defined queue for commands to be provide to remote unit(s), the requirement for "server side control" of any individual transmission on commands (for example, as needed or consumed) is simply not currently claimed as asserted by Applicant. The claims do not prohibit the transfer of the entirety of the queue, script, whatever, from being transferred both/either before or after rebooting state determination(s). The provision for entire lists of commands (i.e., scripts) being transferred between server and remote agent location(s) for remote command execution does not preclude retrieval/transfer/reception/etc., of these commands in a sequential fashion at the remote agent location; transferring a set of single individual commands in an arbitrary sequential order is precisely what occurs when transfer of a file or script form a server is performed to remote agent(s).

Additionally, a script can be reasonably considered a "queue of instructions/commands", since "items are [processed] in the same order in which they [are presented]". Likewise, a queue (in its entirety) can reasonably be considered to comprise a "file containing commands [or other things] to be [processed]". Hence, the definitions set forth by Applicant for claim construction are not found to be clearly convincing in terms of clarifying these terms as two distinct conceptual entities. The selected definitions seem to be hand selected to diverge an intended meaning of the of one term as used, while neglecting the common, everyday use of both terms as readily known and understood in the art at the time of invention. The breadth of these terms simply do not warrant the level of distinction set forth by Applicant in this response.

Applicant employs broad language which includes the use of words and phrases which have broad meanings in the art. In addition, Applicant has not argued any narrower interpretation of the claim language which clearly demarks metes and bounds of these particular terms, nor amended the claims significantly enough to construe a narrower meaning to these limitations. As the claims breadth allows multiple interpretations and meanings which are broader than Applicant's disclosure, the Examiner is forced to interpret the claim limitations as broadly as reasonably possible, in determining patentability of the disclosed invention. Failure for Applicant to significantly narrow definition/scope of the claims and supply arguments commensurate in scope with the claims implies the Applicant intend broad interpretation be given to the claims. Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims (inter alia, In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). The Examiner has interpreted the claims with scope parallel to the Applicant in the response, and iterates the need for the Applicant to clearly, distinctly, and uniquely claim the invention, including enhanced definition of terms, properly ascertainable metes and bounds of the terms used in the claims and specification for proper claim construction, and a clear, defined, and decisive description of the invention in the claims. Lastly, the current claims infer coverage breadth which is inconsistent with breadth of the disclosure and are not found distinguishable above the prior art of record

Applicant has had multiple opportunities to amend the claimed subject matter, and has generally failed to modify the claim language to distinguish over the prior art of record by clarifying or substantially narrowing the claim language. Applicant apparently intends that a broad interpretation be given to the claims and the Examiner has adopted such in the present and previous Office action rejections (In re Prater and Wei, 162 USPQ 541 (CCPA 1969), and MPEP § 2111).

Lastly, further deficiencies in the claims are also evident, including potential issues with proper antecedent basis (inter alia, "said device" is claim 23) which prohibit allowance of the claims at this point, even if distinguishing subject matter is determined.

The Office minimally stands behind the statements of statutory basis set forth in the final rejection.

WDT